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ACTUALLY, WE DID START THE FIRE, AND IT KEEPS ON
BURNING: THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
EFFECTS OF MILITARY BURN PITS IN
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
I. INTRODUCTION
"There is no such thing as the EPA here, folks."'
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) recognized
fifteen years ago that "America's national interests are inextricably
linked with the quality of the earth's environment, and that threats
to the environmental quality affect broad national economic and
security interests."2 A variety of environmental concerns, such as
the destruction of forests, pollution of oceans, and loss of animal
life, affect the safety of United States citizens abroad.3 While the
DoD implements environmental policies overseas that take into
consideration the health and safety of U.S. citizens, the DoD has
nonetheless failed to adequately regulate the environmental conse-
quences of military bases abroad.4
The lack of environmental regulation on overseas bases en-
ables the military to dispose of waste in an environmentally harmful
way.6 According to the DoD, U.S. military operations in Afghani-
stan and Iraq generate roughly ten pounds of solid waste per sol-
dier each day.6 The large volume of waste and lack of disposal
1. Dina Fine Maron, Air Pollution: 'There's No Such Thing as the EPA Here',
GREENWIRE (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2009/11/
11/1 (quoting Russell Keith, remote duty paramedic at Joint Base Balad, when
talking to his new hires about environmental conditions at Joint Base Balad).
2. Memorandum of Understanding Among the Envtl. Prot. Agency, the Dep't
of Energy, and the Dep't of Def. Concerning Cooperation in Envtl. Sec. (July 3,
1996), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/enwestmou.html (emphasizing di-
rect effect between global environmental stability and global safety around world).
3. Margot Laporte, Comment, Being All it Can Be: A Solution to Improve the De-
partment ofDefense's Overseas Environmental Policy, 20 DUKE ENvrL. L. & POL'Y F. 203,
203 (2010) (listing important U.S. global environmental issues potentially affect-
ing U.S foreign policy).
4. See id. at 204 (emphasizing importance of DoD's overseas environmental
policies). For a further discussion surrounding the failure of the DoD to imple-
ment effective regulations for military burn pits, see infra notes 57-72 and accom-
panying text.
5. For a discussion of the unsound ways in which the military disposes of
waste, see infra notes 38-72 and accompanying text.
6. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-63, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ.
DoD SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO ITS GUIDANCE ON OPEN PIT BURNING AND
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 1 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
(117)
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regulations prompted the military to primarily rely on open pit
burning as the most expedient and cost effective method to remove
the generated waste.7
Removing waste through open pit burning potentially causes
serious health ramifications for soldiers on military bases.8
Soldiers, scientists, medical experts, and the media similarly con-
clude that burn pit inhalation causes serious illnesses and injuries,
as well as death.9 The health effects from burning waste are so per-
vasive and detrimental that some medical experts dub burn pits the
"Agent Orange" of our generation.10 Official United States govern-
ment reports, on the other hand, argue there is insufficient evi-
dence to prove military burn pits pose any significant long-term
health effects on soldiers."
d1163.pdf (describing quantity of solid waste produced by soldiers in Afghanistan
and Iraq per day).
7. See id. at 30 (explaining April 2010 DoD report to Congress). "[D]uring
military operations, open air burning will be the safest, most effective, and [most]
expedient manner of solid waste reduction until current research and develop-
ment efforts produces better alternatives. DOD officials added that burn pits are
the most cost-effective waste management practice." Id.
8. For a discussion of adverse health effects from burn pit exposure, see infra
notes 73-167 and accompanying text.
9. See generally ARMED FORCES HEALTH SURVEILLANCE CTR., THE NAVAL HEALTH
RESEARCH CTR. & THE U.S. ARMY PUB. HEALTH COMMAND, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUD-
IES OF HEALTH OUTCOMES AMONG TROOPS DEPLOYED TO BURN PIT SITES 4 (May 27,
2010), available at http://fhp.osd.mil/pdfs/100604_FINALBurnPitEpiStudies.
pdf (noting similar health issues among veterans). "[A]necdotal reports of com-
plaints by Service members of eye and respiratory symptoms have been attributed
to exposure to burn pit smoke, and news outlets and Members of Congress have
expressed concern that exposure to burn pit smoke in certain deployed settings is
causing adverse health effects." Id. For a further discussion of medical experts,
media, and soldiers concluding military burn pits cause long-term damage to
troops, see infra notes 125-167 and accompanying text.
10. See Carole Bartoo, Home Sick: Vanderbilt Physicians Champion for Veterans with
Lung Illnesses, VAND. MED., Summer 2010, at 21, available at http://www.mc.
vanderbilt.edu/documents/vanderbiltmedicine/files/VUMCMedSummerlO.pdf
(recognizing unavoidable health impacts and illnesses associated with war). "Viet-
nam had Agent Orange. Desert Storm had Gulf War Syndrome. It is becoming
apparent that respiratory problems are the illness of our current wars in the Mid-
dle East." Id. Senator Russ Feingold also compared the health issues currently
facing veterans with those of Agent Orange: "[t]he Defense Department's slow
reaction has exposed another generation of veterans to the exact same carcino-
gens found in Agent Orange." Kelly Kennedy, War-zone Burn Pits Violate Laws, GAO
Says, MARINE CORPS TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010, 7:56 PM), http://www.maine
corpstimes.com/news/2010/10/military-gao-says-burn-pits-violate-laws-101410w/
(hereinafter War-zone).
11. See DEP'T OF DEF., EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF HEALTH OUTCOMES
AMONG TROOPS DEPLOYED TO BURN PIT SIES REPORT 2 (October 2010), available at
http://fhp.osd.mil/pdfs/AFHSCReportFACTSHEETFINAL_2010_10 13.pdf
(summarizing ESHO report produced by AFHSC and NHRC). "The overall pre-
liminary findings indicate, at this time, no substantial or consistent health effects
2
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In 2010, due to public outcry over burn pits, the government
published two official studies investigating the health effects of
burn pit inhalation.12 These reports-one conducted by the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) and another jointly con-
ducted by the Armed Forces Health Service Center (AFHSC) and
the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC)-are contradictory, in-
complete, and inadequate.13 Without conclusive data, the debate
continues regarding both the harmfulness of burn pits to the sur-
rounding environment, and the necessary precautions to prevent
such harm.14
This Comment examines the use, regulation, and environmen-
tal health effects of burn pits in Afghanistan and Iraq. 15 Part II
provides a brief overview of the U.S. military's use of burn pits in
Afghanistan and Iraq.16 Part III discusses military burn pit regula-
tions and the DoD's failure to implement coherent and enforceable
policies.17 Part IV analyzes the ongoing debate regarding the
harmfulness of burn pits to soldiers and the surrounding environ-
ment.' 8 Finally, Part V discusses DoD improvements to burn pit
policies, alternative approaches to waste management, and the diffi-
culties soldiers face in obtaining compensation for burn pit
injuries. 19
in personnel assigned to locations with burn pits at the bases examined, on a popu-
lation-wide basis, compared to other deployers." Id.
12. See U.S. Gov'T AccouNrAlLU Y OFFICE, supra note 6, at 43 (explaining
completion of various studies, including ESHO report, in response to concerns
over military personnel exposure to burn pit emissions).
13. For a further discussion of how the GAO and the report jointly conducted
by the AFHSC and NHRC are contradictory, incomplete, and inadequate, see infra
notes 85-112 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the continuing debate on the extent of harm
to soldier's health caused by military burn pits, see infta notes 73-167 and accom-
panying text.
15. For a further discussion of the use, regulations, and environmental health
effects of military burn pits, see infra notes 20-207 and accompanying text.
16. For a brief overview of military burn pits in Afghanistan and Iraq, see infra
notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of military burn pit regulations and the failure of
the DOD to implement effective regulations, see infra notes 38-72 and accompany-
ing text.
18. For further discussion on the environmental and health effects military
burn pits on soldiers, see infra notes 73-167 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of DoD's future burn pit policies, alternative ap-
proaches to waste management, and the difficulties soldiers face in obtaining com-
pensation for burn pit illnesses and injuries, see infra notes 168-207 and
accompanying text.
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II. OVERVIEW OF MILITARY BuRN PITS
The DoD disposed of waste in open burn pits since the begin-
ning of military operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in
2003.20 Generally, open burning occurs in either shallow excava-
tions or surface features with berms.2' Burn pits typically accumu-
late the following types of waste: batteries, plastics, biohazard
materials, solvents, asbestos, chemical and medical wastes, items
doused with diesel fuel, Styrofoam, food from dining facilities, dis-
carded electronics, clothing, tires, metal containers, furniture, and
even human remains.22 Upon burning the waste products, various
toxins are released into the air: dioxins, particulate matter, poly-
cyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, carbon
monoxide, and hexachlorobenzene.23
Burn pits remain prevalent on military bases in Afghanistan,
and were also prevalent in Iraq until recently.2 4 In August 2010, the
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated there
were 251 burn pits in Afghanistan and twenty-two in Iraq.2 5 In addi-
tion to the large quantity of burn pits utilized in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the magnitude of certain burn pits is staggering.26 The Joint
Base Balad (JBB) operated the largest burn pit in Iraq, which
peaked at nearly 240 tons of burned trash per day in 2007.27 The
average daily disposal rate at JBB nearly triples that of Juneau,
Alaska-a city comparable in population with an average disposal
20. See generally U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 1 (report-
ing use of military burn pits since outset of Iraq and Afghanistan wars).
21. See generally id. (describing general characteristics of military burn pits).
For the purposes of this Comment, a berm is defined as "a narrow shelf, path, or
ledge typically at the top or bottom of a slope." MERRIAM WEBSTER, MERRIAM-WEB-
STER'S COLLEGIATE DiCrIONARY, Berm Definition 107 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds.,
10th ed. 2001).
22. Complaint at 12, Bittel v. KBR, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-05041, 2009 WL 1970739
(W.D. Mo. filed May 29, 2009) (listing items placed in burn pits).
23. AIR FORCE INST. FOR OPERATIONAL HEALTH, OPEN PIT BURNING GENERAL
FACTS AND INFORMATION 1 (2004), available at http://deploymenthealthlibrary.fhp.
osd.mil/Product/RetrieveFile?prodld=55 (listing and explaining toxins released
from burning waste).
24. See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILTY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 8-9
(describing pervasiveness of military burn pits in Afghanistan and Iraq).
25. Id. at 9 (enumerating number of burn pits in Afghanistan and Iraq as of
August 2010).
26. See generally Adam Levine, Effects of Toxic Smoke Worry Troops Returning from
Iraq, CNN.com (Dec. 15, 2008, 7:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/15/
burn.pits/index.html (describing largest burn pit at JBB in Iraq and similar pits
throughout Iraq and Afghanistan).
27. See Kennedy, War-zone, supra note 10 (specifying details of waste burned at
JBB burn pit in Iraq).
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rate of eighty-three tons of waste per day.28 Over a period of four
years, the JBB often used jet fuel to burn the trash, which included
plastics, food, and medical waste.29 Thus, the JBB burn pit spewed
acrid smoke over the housing and hospital sites on the military base
for four years.30
As 30,000 people are present at the JBB at any given time, the
number of individuals potentially exposed to this toxic smoke is in
the tens of thousands.31 The military eventually shut down the JBB
burn pit, yet as of May 2011 seventy-eight burn pits remain through-
out Afghanistan and continuously expose troops to toxic fumes. 3 2
Estimates reveal that approximately 350,000 troops have been ex-
posed to toxic fumes from open-air burn pits in Afghanistan and
Iraq.3 3
Further, military personnel paid little attention to the specific
items tossed into the burn pits for much of the last ten years. 34 In
July 2008, an army aviator explained the military's indiscretion, not-
ing, "Anything and everything gets burned, and we get to breathe
the smoke."35 This imprudence results from the DoD's failure to
regulate burn pits throughout most of the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars.36 The army aviator expounded upon the DoD's lack of ur-
gency in creating environmentally safe waste disposal policies when
28. See Kelly Kennedy, Burn Pit at Balad Raises Health Concerns, ARmY TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2008, 12:13:37 EDT), available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/
2008/10/militaryburnpit_102708w/ [hereinafter Burn Pit] (comparing daily
waste output in Juneau, Alaska to daily waste output at JBB in Iraq).
29. See generally Levine, supra note 26 (describing quantity of waste burned
with jet fuel).
30. See id. (detailing how smoke blew over hospital and living quarters of mili-
tary at JBB).
31. See The 'Burn Pits'ofIraq and Afghanistan, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 31,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=123187642 (inter-
viewing Kelly Kennedy, reporter for The Military Times, covering burn pit
exposure).
32. See generally Howard Altman, Senators Press For Burn Pit Update From Military,
THE TAMPA TRIBUNE (May 18, 2011), available at http://www2.tbo.com/news/
breaking-news/2011/may/ 18/senators-press-for-burn-pit-update-from-military-ar-
208270 (reporting seventy-eight burn pits still active in Afghanistan).
33. See generally Brie Cadman, Veterans Fight for Benefits After Toxic Burn Pit Expo-
sures, CHANGE.ORG (Oct. 5, 2010), http://news.change.org/stories/veterans-fight-
for-benefits-after-toxic-bum-pit-exposures (approximating 350,000 troops were ex-
posed to burn pit fumes in Iraq and Afghanistan).
34. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 8 (describing
CENTCOM's 2009 comprehensive guidance regarding operation and monitoring
of open pit burning).
35. Kennedy, Burn Pit, supra note 28 (quoting army aviator's description of
JBB burn pit).
36. See generally, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 45
(summarizing conclusions of GAO report).
2012] 121
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he explained, "There is no way on Earth this would ever be allowed
back home because of all the toxins and pollutants that result, but
hey, we're not at home, so it must be OK, right?"37
III. BURN PIT REGULATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
The military relied heavily upon open burn pits to dispose of
large quantities of solid waste since the beginning of the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq; however, CENTCOM did not develop com-
prehensive guidelines on operating or monitoring burn pits until
2009.38 Prior to issuing guidelines, the military merely noted the
inherent dangers of open burning and suggested various alterna-
tives, such as landfills and pollution prevention. 39 A September
2006 Army Technical Bulletin on Guidelines for Field Waste Man-
agement noted "troops should use open burning only in 'emer-
gency situations,' because it can lead to 'significant environmental
exposures.' "40
A. DoD Regulations and Supplemental Guidance
In 2006, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) engineering
staff developed policies to address various environmental issues in
Iraq, including hazardous and solid wastes. 41 CENTCOM then is-
sued the developed policies to U.S. forces in Iraq as fragmentary
orders (FRAGO). 42 While these FRAGOs were consolidated into
the MNC-I Environmental Standard Operating Procedure 2006 (2006 Op-
erating Procedure) and discouraged use of burn pits, the 2006 Operat-
ing Procedure did not provide the military with policies addressing
the operation or monitoring of burn pits. 43
In April 2009, the MNC-I revised the 2006 Operating Procedure
"to provide environmental guidance to U.S. forces... and civilian
37. Kennedy, Burn Pit, supra note 28 (quoting army aviator's explanation of
almost nonexistent burn pit regulations overseas).
38. See U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABIUTY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 8 (emphasizing
implementation of military burn pits began at start of both wars in 2001 and 2003,
but comprehensive regulations were not enacted until 2009).
39. See id. at 10 (underscoring early guidance merely noted military burn pits
presented some dangers).
40. Id. (quoting Army Technical Bulletin on Guidelines for Field Waste
Management).
41. See id. at 10-11 (describing implementation of environmental policies
through MNC-I).
42. See id. (detailing issuance of MNC-I environmental policies).
43. U.S. Gov'T AcCOUNTABILUTY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 10-11 (noting lack of
comprehensive detail on environmental regulations for operating or monitoring
burn pits in Iraq).
6
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contractors, operating in Iraq."4 4 The MNC-I Environmental Stan-
dard Operating Procedure 2009 (2009 Operating Procedure) described
burn pits as "an expedient means to destroy solid waste during con-
tingency operations."45 The 2009 Operating Procedure, however, ex-
pressly forbade open burning without written authorization from
the base commander.4 6 When authorized by a base commander,
the procedures prohibited destruction of specific items in burn
pits, including hazardous waste, batteries, tires, electronics, and ap-
pliances.47 Further, the 2009 Operating Procedure provided guidance
on "siting burn pits, securing them, managing burn pit ash, and
overseeing open burning." 4 8
Consistent with the 2006 and 2009 MNC-I guidance, in Sep-
tember 2009, the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) issued guide-
lines focused on best management practices during contingency
operations in Afghanistan.4 9 The USFOR-A stated, "the ultimate
goal for enduring bases in Afghanistan is to transition to compost-
ing and recycling, to nearly eliminate the need for all forms of in-
cineration."50 The USFOR-A guidance expanded the list of
prohibited burn items established in the MNC-I guidance and addi-
tionally banned pesticide containers, asphalt shingles, treated
wood, and coated electrical wires.5 1 Also in September 2009,
CENTCOM issued Regulation 200-2, which created more stringent
regulations than MNC-I or USFOR-A and further restricted what
items may be disposed of in burn pits. 52
To further enhance environmental regulation of burn pits,
Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
44. Id. at 11 (elaborating upon MNC-I Environmental Standard Operating Proce-
dure 2009 revisions to Operating Procedure 2006 in order to create specific guidance
for handling of waste during contingency operations).
45. Id. (explaining position of Operating Procedure 2009 that burn pits reflect
one way to dispose waste expediently).
46. See Id. (explaining key difference between Operating Procedure 2009 and
Operating Procedure 2006).
47. Id. (listing items prohibited from burn pits in Operating Procedure 2009).
48. U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABILfY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 11 (finding Operating
Procedure 2009 incorporates more comprehensive guidelines).
49. See id. (comparing Operating Procedure 2006 and Operating Procedure 2009
with USFOR-A guidance).
50. Id. (emphasizing USFOR-A ultimate goal as transitioning from burn pits
to more environmentally responsible waste disposal methods).
51. See id. at 11-12 (comparing items prohibited from burn pits in MNC-1 gui-
dance and items prohibited in USFOR-A guidance).
52. See id. at 12 (discussing CENTCOM regulation 200-2 and DoD trend to-
ward implementing more stringent regulations).
2012] 123
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for Fiscal Year 2010, in October 2009.5- "Section 317 of the
[NDAA] requires DoD to prescribe regulations prohibiting the dis-
posal of covered waste in open-air burn pits during contingency op-
erations, except in circumstances in which the Secretary of Defense
determines that no alternative disposal method is feasible."54 In
March 2010, the DoD further prohibited disposal of covered waste
in open-air burn pits through issuance of Directive-type Memoran-
dum (DTM) 09-232 in adherence to the Section 317 require-
ments. 5 5 According to a senior DoD official, "the DTM is a
worldwide policy that applies to all DoD components, including
CENTCOM."56
B. The DOD's Burn Pit Regulation Failures
Burn pit regulation, as summarized in the GAO report, pro-
vides only a bare-bones sketch of the complications surrounding
the regulation of burn pits.5 7 In reality, the DoD's actions overseas
are governed by a complicated series of international treaties, Sta-
tus of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), U.S. domestic laws and regula-
tions, and DoD instructions, directives, and technical manuals.58
There are few obligations requiring the DoD to protect human
health because most U.S. environmental laws and regulations do
not have extraterritorial application.59 As a result, the DoD governs
its actions abroad with its own policies, directives, instructions, and
program and field manuals, all of which may not have legally bind-
ing effects.6 0 Since many U.S. environmental laws do not have ex-
traterritorial application, the Overseas Environmental Baseline
Guidance Document (OEBGD) creates baseline environmental
standards incorporating those requirements of U.S. law that have
53. See U.S. Gov'T AccouNTABILTY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing en-
actment of National Defense Authorization Act in October 2009 and its require-
ments of DoD).
54. Id. at 12-13 (describing section 317 of NDAA act as prohibiting pit burn-
ing unless no feasible alternative disposal method).
55. See id. at 13 (delineating DTM 09-232 as a response to § 317 of NDAA).
56. Id. (explaining general applicability of DTM 09-232 and specific applica-
bility to all DoD burn pit policies and regulations).
57. See generally Kate Donovan Kurera, Comment, Military Burn Pits in Iraq and
Afghanistan: Considerations and Obstacles for Emerging Litigation, 28 PACE ENvrL. L.
REv. 288, 293 (2010) (describing complexity of DoD's implementation of environ-
mental policies regarding burn pits in Iraq and Afghanistan).
58. See id. at 293 (cataloguing various regulations, treaties, and agreements
governing DoD environmental policies abroad).
59. Id. at 294 (explicating most U.S. environmental laws and regulations do
not have extraterritorial application).
60. See id. at 295 (explaining difficulties involved in DoD enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations overseas).
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extraterritorial application, and are applicable to DoD installations,
facilities, and actions.61
DoD officials, CENTCOM officials, and senior military officers
acknowledge U.S. forces have not always adhered to burn pit gui-
dance. 6 2 Prior to CENTCOM's 2009 regulation, many items "were
routinely disposed of in burn pits" despite the prohibitions, includ-
ing "regulated medical waste, hazardous waste, and substantial qual-
ities of plastic."63 Options for waste disposal were limited early on
in both wars because officials viewed troop safety and mission suc-
cess as more important than environmental concerns during
combat.64
CENTCOM inconsistently implemented the 2009 regulation
for several reasons.65 First, the GAO found environmental officials
occasionally unaware of the regulations and requirements for burn
pit operations. 66 Without proper guidance, burn pit operators
lacked the necessary knowledge to minimize the risks associated
with exposure to burn pit emissions.67 Second, adherence to safety
regulations proved difficult because many of the supplies arriving at
the bases were made or packaged in burn pit prohibited materi-
als. 68 Drinking water, for example, arrived in plastic bottles that
61. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INsTRUCrION 4715.5, MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL COMPLIANCE AT OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS 91 1.2 (April 22, 1996), available at
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/471505p.pdf (explaining necessity of environ-
mental compliance standards in foreign countries via OEBGD because many U.S.
environmental regulations do not apply).
62. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 16 (stating DoD in-
consistently followed health protection guidelines regarding burn pits).
63. Id. (determining U.S. forces have not always followed protocol in Afghani-
stan and Iraq).
64. See id. (discussing limited waste disposal options in early stages of Afghani-
stan and Iraq wars and recognizing inherent difficulties in implementing environ-
mental regulations when DoD's main concern was troop safety during combat
missions).
65. For a further discussion of the reasons for variability in implementation of
CENTCOM's 2009 regulations, see infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
66. See U.S. Gov'T AccOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 19 (finding envi-
ronmental officials at Iraq's Warhorse base unaware of regulations and compliance
requirements). The two service members managing the Warhorse burn pit at-
tested that "they used a standard operating procedure document provided to them
when they began managing the burn pit in August 2009." Id. According to one of
the service members, "the main purpose of this guidance was to direct their deal-
ings with contractors delivering waste to the burn pit." Id.
67. See id. (explaining lack of proper guidelines prevents safe disposal of
waste).
68. See id. (adhering to regulations requires supplies be packaged in more
environmentally friendly methods).
2012] 125
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were shrink-wrapped in plastic.69 Third, contractors did not always
have contracts reflecting current guidance.70 Additionally, when
DoD officials requested the contractor to incorporate the modified
DoD provisions, "such contract modifications [were] typically long
and tedious, often requiring months of negotiations." 7  Another
reason for the disparity in burn pit safety across bases was the vari-
ance among the resources and commitments of base commanders
and environmental officers.72
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH EFFECTS FROM BURN PIT ExPosuRE
Burn pit exposure has generated complaints from service
members since 2003.73 According to the GAO, U.S. forces in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq do not sample or monitor burn pit emissions as
provided by CENTCOM regulations.74 The AFHSC and NHRC
could not collect data on individual exposure to smoke or hazard-
69. See id. (describing commonly used supply methods and packaging materi-
als as example of challenges associated with adhering to CENTCOM regulations).
70. See id. (illustrating lack of compliance with overseas base relying upon and
observing MNC-I Environmental Standard Operating Procedure 2006 as noted in burn
pit contract, rather than more recent 2009 regulations).
Thus the company provided Iraq burn pit management activities in the
context of that guidance, which contains less stringent requirements than
the CENTCOM 2009 regulation. According to the contractor's represen-
tative, the company prepared plans, which DOD reviewed and approved,
based on the MNC-I 2006 guidance. However, DOD officially requested
the contractor incorporate MNC-I Environmental Standard Operating Proce-
dure 2009 into its operations.
Id.
71. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 19 (concluding out-
dated contracts result in contractor inability to abide by relevant and applicable
environmental regulations).
72. See id. at 20 (explaining impact of variances in resources and commit-
ments of involved personnel).
[A] 11 four of the burn pits we visited had programs to sort incoming waste
to avoid burning prohibited items and to remove anything that could be
used against U.S. forces. However, the amount of resources devoted to
this activity varied substantially. At Al Asad, for example, a commissioned
officer oversaw all burn pit and incinerator activities. At this base, an
Iraqi contractor under U.S. servicemembers' supervision sorted waste
before it went into the burn pit, segregating certain waste for recycling,
such as large plastics, metals, wood, mattresses, rubber and reusables
(such as furniture). This process required a crew of 15 to 20 people and
took all day.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 20.
73. See U.S. ARMY CTR. FOR HEALuTH PROMOTION AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE
(USACHPPM), No. 47-002-1208, JUST THE FACTS: BALAD BURN PIT 1 (2008), availa-
ble at http://phc.amedd.army.mil/phc%20resource%201ibrary/baladburnpit4712
08.pdf (noting service members lodged complaints regarding burn pits since be-
ginning of Iraq war).
74. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 31 (finding mili-
tary has not adhered to regulation and established "systems to sample or monitor
10
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ous chemicals, leaving the Epidemiological Studies of Health Out-
comes Among Troops Deployed to Burn Pit Sites Report (ESHO
Report) without the necessary information to assess the impact of
burn pit exposure on soldiers.7 5 As a result of the military and gov-
ernment investigators' inability to collect sufficient data on burn pit
emissions or exposure, the health impacts from burn pit exposure
are not well understood.7 6
Without data on individual exposure, there is a wide spectrum
of thought on the harmfulness of burn pit exposure to soldiers."
Some view burn pits as having "no substantial or consistent health
effects" on troops, such as the official ESHO Report.78 The ESHO
Report emphasized the difficulty in establishing a causal relation-
ship between environmental exposure and illness.7 9
On the other side of the debate, medical studies by the Allergy,
Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine Division of Vanderbilt Uni-
versity found that burn pits do contribute to widespread respiratory
pollutants emitted from burn pits and incinerators and documentation of poten-
tial exposures").
75. See DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 11, at 3 (2010) (maintaining reservations
due to lack of individual exposure data to environmental particulates and ex-
pressed concerns during meetings and teleconferences held by environmental/
occupational physicians and epidemiologists at the Services' public health hubs
and at AFHSC).
76. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 31 (recognizing
lack of data on individual exposure and DoD's inability to follow sampling require-
ments results in misjudged health impacts of burn pit exposure).
[W]hen burn pit sampling shows high levels of certain pollutants, the
regulation directs relevant officials to determine the cause and identify
solutions. Additionally, the regulation identifies substances that should
be considered for sampling from burn pits at least yearly. These sub-
stances and the health risks they pose as described by EPA or the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry include: carbon monoxide ...
dioxins ... particulate matter 10 and 2.5 ... polycyclic aromatic hydrocar-
bons . . . hexachlorobenzene . . . and volatile organic compounds.
Id.
77. Compare Bartoo, supra note 10, at 22 (finding inhalation of smoke from
military burn pits can cause widespread and serious respiratory problems); with
DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 11, at 2 (finding "no substantial or consistent health
effects in personnel assigned to locations with burn pits at the bases examined, on
a population-wide basis, compared to other deployers").
78. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 11, at 2 (concluding study did not produce any
evidence to suggest military burn pit inhalation causes adverse health effects).
79. SeeJames Risen, Veterans Sound Alarm Over Burn Pit Exposure, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 6, 2010, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/0 7/us/
07burn.html (cautioning of difficulties involved in establishing causality between
environmental exposure and illness); see DEPT OF DEF., supra note 11, at 1, 3
(drawing conclusions but also recognizing limitations associated with epidemiolog-
ical studies).
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problems in the Middle East.80 In fact, the studies determined
burn pit exposure is comparable to Vietnam's Agent Orange and
Desert Storm's Gulf War Syndrome.8' Several other independent
studies asserted that official government studies are inadequate and
downplay any connection between soldier illnesses and burn pit ex-
posure.82 Thus, a growing fissure exists between the government's
official position, under which the DoD, VA, AFHSC, and NHRC
proceed cautiously in linking soldiers' symptoms to burn pit expo-
sure, and the position of non-governmental reports, which con-
cludes that military burn pits cause significant respiratory problems
and other illnesses. 3 Determining the severity and duration of
burn pit exposure injuries and illnesses will determine two issues:
whether the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) will compensate
military personnel for such maladies, and whether soldiers and
their families can prevail in lawsuits against military contractors.84
A. The GAO Report and Its Shortcomings
Two government reports released in 2010 examined the health
effects of military burn pit exposure-the GAO report entitled DoD
Should Improve Adherence to Its Guidance on Open Pit Burning and Solid
Waste Management (GAO Report), and the ESHO Report conducted
by the AFHSC and the NHRC.85 Pressured by complaints from vet-
erans and members of Congress, the VA funded the Institute of
80. See Bartoo, supra note 10, at 22 (finding correlation of respiratory
problems with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq).
81. See id. (comparing burn pit exposure to Agent Orange).
82. See id. (recognizing inadequacies in government studies of burn pit
exposure).
83. For a further discussion of the fissure between the federal government's
hesitation to link soldiers' symptoms to burn pit exposure, and the view of outside
medical reports discerning a causation between military burn pits and significant
respiratory problems and other illnesses, see infra notes 88-168 and accompanying
text.
84. See generally Kurera, supra note 57, at 300 (holding soldier Plaintiffs must
prove burn pit smoke is "more likely than not the cause of their injuries" to prevail
in class action lawsuit against military contractor KBR in toxic tort suit); LETTER
FROM DEP'T OF VETERAN AFFAIRS TO ALL VETERAN AFFAIRS REGIONAL OFFIcEs (Apr.
26, 2010), available at militarytimes.com/static/projects/pages/VA_environmen-
talletter.doc (finding service members can be exposed to environmental hazards
in course of their military duties, which may result in adverse health effects). "Nu-
merous environmental hazards in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other military installa-
tions that could potentially present health risks to service members and Veterans
have been identified." LETTER FROM DEP'T OF VETERAN AFFAIRS TO ALL VETERAN
AFFAIRS REGIONAL OFFICES (Apr. 26, 2010), available at militarytimes.com/static/
projects/pages/VA.environmentalletter.doc.
85. For further elaboration on the two government issued burn pit reports,
see infra notes 88-112 and accompanying text.
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Medicine (Institute) to conduct a large-scale study of the health ef-
fects arising from burn pit exposure.86 The Institute projects the
report will be finalized by the fall of 2011.87 The VA instructed the
GAO only in part to examine the air quality and potential health
impacts of burn pits.8 8 Consequently, the GAO Report's discussion
of health effects from burn pit exposure is limited.89 Instead, the
report highlights "neither U.S. Forces in Afghanistan nor Iraq have
monitored burn pit pollutants as directed," because they have not
produced data on individual exposure to burn pits.90 Thus, the
GAO found the "health impacts of burn pit exposure on individuals
are not well understood."9' The GAO Report concluded that when
the ESHO Report is released it will "assist in efforts to understand
the health effects associated with exposure to burn pit smoke by
conducting additional epidemiological studies."92 As the GAO pre-
dicted, the ESHO Report explored the health effects of burn pit
exposure in greater detail.9 3
B. The ESHO Report and Its Flaws
The ESHO Report was completed by the AFSCH and the
NHRC "to look for associations of illness or other health conditions
among deployed U.S. Service member populations who were as-
signed to locations with burn pits."9 4 The health conditions in-
86. See Risen, supra note 79 (discussing imminent availability of large-scale
study on possible impacts of burn pit exposure).
87. See generally Phillip O'Connor, Veterans Fight VA Over Exposure to Burn Pits,
ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, (Sept 13, 2010, 12:30 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/metro/article_6ee6516a-d8c5-55ab-a850 e7700f4cf26b.html (reporting
2011 release of Institute of Medicine study).
88. See U.S. Gov'T ACCoUNTABILIrY OFFICE, supra note 6, at Highlights (ex-
plaining purpose and findings of GAO report). GAO was invited to investigate the
U.S. military's use of open burn pits in Afghanistan and Iraq, and subsequently
report on: "(1) [the] extent of open pit burning in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
whether the military has followed its guidance; (2) alternatives to burn pits, and
whether the military has examined them; and (3) [the] extent of efforts to moni-
tor air quality and potential health impacts." Id.
89. See id. at 31 (rationalizing GAO's limited focus on harm of burn pit expo-
sure because GAO was asked only in part to discuss health impacts of burn pit
exposure).
90. See generally id. (explaining deficiencies in measuring effects of burn pit
exposure).
91. Id. (concluding burn pit exposure is not well understood due to limited
available data).
92. Id. at 43 (stating AFHSC will conduct more thorough report).
93. For a further discussion of the ESHO report, see infra notes 94-112 and
accompanying text.
94. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 11, at 1 (explaining main purpose of ESHO
study as examination of burn pit exposure effects on soldiers).
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cluded in the report were: "[r]espiratory symptoms and diseases,
cardiovascular disease, chronic multisymptom illness (CMI), lupus
erthyematosus, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep apnea, and birth out-
comes for infants of parents who had deployed."95 In every area of
the study, the AFSCH and NHRC determined "there was no sub-
stantial or consistent health effects in personnel assigned to loca-
tions with burn pits at the bases examined compared to other
deployers."96
While the AFSCH and NHRC adamantly contended burn pits
do not have "substantial or consistent health effects" on soldiers ex-
posed to burn pits, the report is contradictory and incomplete. 97
The introduction of the report notes personal observation and pub-
lic outcry as the impetus of the study, rather than scientific evi-
dence.98 It states, "anecdotal reports of complaints by Service
members . . . news outlets and Members of Congress have ex-
pressed concern that exposure to burn pit smoke in certain
deployed settings is causing adverse health effects."99
The report is at times contradictory and discounts data poten-
tially attributable to negative health effects from burn pit expo-
sure. 00 For example, the study concluded the primary analysis for
burn pit exposure before and during pregnancy for active duty mili-
tary personnel "was not associated with an increase in birth de-
fects." 01 Two sentences later, however, the NHRC found an
increased risk of birth defects among infants of male service mem-
bers deployed to a burn pit region more than 280 days prior to
95. Id. (listing specific illnesses and injuries studied and potentially associated
with burn pit exposure).
96. Id. at 2 (concluding study yielded no tangible results to substantial mili-
tary burn pit exposure as cause of adverse health effects on soldiers).
97. Id. at 2 (indicating no link found between military burn pit exposure and
adverse health effects). For further discussion of the ESHO report as contradic-
tory, incomplete, inadequate, and seemingly adamant stance that military burn
pits do not cause serious long-term health effects on soldiers, see infra notes 100-
112 and accompanying text.
98. See generally ARMED FORCEs HEALTH SURVEILLANCE CTR., supra note 9, at 3
(explaining underlying concerns regarding health risks for soldiers inhaling burn
pit smoke).
99. Id. at 3 (explaining, in part, study was conducted to explore effects of
burn pit exposure).
100. For a further discussion of the substantively contradictory nature of the
ESHO report and attempt to diminish data potentially attributable to negative
health effects from burn pit exposure, see infra notes 101-108 and accompanying
text.
101. See ARMED FORCEs HEALTH SURVEILLANCE CTR., supra note 9, at 4 (citing
NHRC study revealing birth defects from burn pit exposure).
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their infant's date of conception. 0 2 Further, the study discounts
data suggesting a correlation between burn pit exposure and an
increased risk of lupus. 03 It first concluded it was possible burn pit
exposure was not generally associated with an increased risk in lu-
pus, but later stated there existed a statistically elevated risk of
newly reported lupus for those deployed within close proximity to
the JBB burn pit.10 4
Additionally, the AFSCH and NHRC are skeptical of the JBB
burn pit exposure statistics.1 05 JBB had the highest proportion of
service members report exposure to smoke from burning trash and
feces, as well as the highest percentage of medical encounters re-
garding respiratory issues.' 0 6 The AFSCH and NHRC diminish the
JBB data since "it is not known if results are reflective of actual
health problems and exposures or simply a reflection of personal
differences in how the [soldier] was completing the forms."107 The
AFSCH and NHRC are also skeptical of soldiers' recollections of
burn pit exposure and advise those reading the report that "deploy-
ment form data should be interpreted cautiously," because self-re-
ported exposures and health outcomes from JBB may be subject to
a reporting or recall bias.108
Moreover, the AFSCH and NHRC acknowledge some limita-
tions of the study. 09 The study did not collect data on individual
exposure to smoke or hazardous chemicals, arguably leading to in-
adequate and misleading data.o10 Further, the AFSCH and NHRC
could not measure potential misclassifications regarding actual and
102. See id. at 4 (explaining NHRC study found statistically significant increase
in risk of birth defects among infants born to fathers exposed to burn pits more
than 280 days prior to conception of infant).
103. For further examination of ESHO contradictions and discredit of data
indicating negative health effects from the ESHO lupus findings, see infra notes
104-108 and accompanying text.
104. See ARMED FORCEs HEALTH SURVEILLANCE CTR., supra note 9, at 4 (deter-
mining NHRC conclusion of relationship between burn pit exposure and risk of
lupus should be further investigated).
105. For a further discussion of the skepticism surrounding AFSCH and
NHRC analyzes of JBB burn pit exposure statistics, see infra notes 106-108 and
accompanying text.
106. See ARMED FORCES HEALTH SURVEILLANCE CTR., supra note 9, at 17-19 (re-
porting and discussing findings from JBB study).
107. Id. (offering caveat for potential inaccuracy of statistics from JBB).
108. See id. (explaining rationale underlying skepticism regarding soldiers'
recollections).
109. See id. (noting several limitations to studies conducted by AFSCH and
NHRC report).
110. See id. (determining unavailability of data on individual environmental
exposures over time).
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degree of exposure." Finally, the study did not include data for
longer-term trends, which is often standard practice for studies ex-
amining toxic exposure. 112
C. Non-Governmental Reports
Non-governmental reports offer evidence contrary to the
AFSCH and NHRC's conclusion of "no substantial or consistent
health effects in personnel assigned to locations with burn pits at
the bases examined compared to other deployers."" 3 Beginning in
2006, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Darrin Curtis, a former
bioenvironmental flight commander atJBB, issued a memorandum
identifying a burn pit as an "acute health hazard for individuals."" 4
In response to Lieutenant Curtis's memorandum, the U.S. Army
Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
(USACHPPM) conducted periodic sampling of the air atJBB from
2003 to 2007.15 USACHPPM's sampling indicated the presence of
harmful pollutants such as "dioxins, polyaromatic hydrocarbons,
and volatile organic compounds," but all pollutants were reportedly
within acceptable ranges, according to Military Exposure Guide-
lines (MEG).' 16 After completion of the sampling, USACHPPM
maintained that "long-term health effects are not expected to occur
from breathing the [burn pit] smoke."" 7
Medical experts, however, challenged the government's con-
clusions.118 During a November 2009 Senate Democratic Policy
Committee Hearing on military burn pits, Dr. Anthony Szema,
Chief of the Allergy Section at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center,
111. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 11, at 2 (listing limitations of ESHO study and
emphasizing possible misclassification of individuals as exposed to burn pits in the
absence of individual exposure statistics).
112. SeeJean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39 ARIz. ST. L.J.
383, 447 (2007) (determining latent illness could be factor in litigation due to
soldiers' early exposure to burn pit since 2004).
113. For a further discussion on non-governmental reports and evidence con-
trary to the ESHO's conclusion, see infra notes 114-167 and accompanying text.
114. Memorandum from Darren L. Curtis, Lt. Col., Dep't of Air Force, to
Dept' of Air Force, 332d. Air Expeditionary Wing, Balad Air Base Iraq, 1-2 (Dec.
20, 2006), available at http://dpc.senate.gov/hearings/hearing50/memoburn_
pits-122006.pdf (describing dangers ofJBB burn pit).
115. See U.S. ARMY CTR., supra note 73, at I (showing environmental sampling
at JBB was conducted from 2003 to 2007).
116. Id. at 1 (listing harmful pollutants produced from burn pits but within
acceptable ranges).
117. Id. (finding military burn pits might not cause long term adverse health
effects on soldiers).
118. For a further discussion on medical experts challenging government re-
ports' conclusions, see infra notes 119-167 and accompanying text.
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disputed the accuracy of USACHPPM's studies.119 Dr. Szema testi-
fied that the USACHPPM's assessments were flawed because they
did not measure the particulate matter found at military burn
pits. 1 2 0 He noted, "The size of the particulate matter is important
to consider because the particles act as a carrier of various harmful
chemicals in the air. The smaller the particular matter, the deeper
the particles are able to travel into the lungs."121 Dr. Szema testi-
fied the health risks from exposure to particulate matter include
not only "risk of asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema . .. but there
is also an association with respiratory and cardiovascular mortal-
ity-death-from inhalation of ultra fine particulate matter."l 22
For months after Dr. Szema's testimony, the DoD maintained that
"only minor, temporary effects have been identified with the burn
pit smoke." 123 The DoD has now slightly reversed its position by
acknowledging "burn pit smoke causes acute health effects in some
people," but "it is less clear what other longer-term health effects
may be associated with burn pit smoke inhalation." 2 4
There are other non-military medical experts determined to
uncover the truth behind the respiratory ailments veterans suffer
after returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.12 5 Dr. Robert Miller, an
associate professor at Vanderbilt University's Allergy, Pulmonary
and Critical Care Medicine Division, and his colleagues conducted
research on burn pit exposure over the last seven years.126 Dr.
Miller testified before Congress on numerous occasions and contin-
ues to voice his concerns that soldiers are exposed to airborne tox-
119. See Are Burn Pits Making Our Soldiers Sick?: Hearing Before the S. Democratic
Policy Comm., 111th Cong. 2-3 (2009) (statement from Dr. Anthony Szema, Chief of
the Allergy Section, Veterans Affairs Medical Center) [hereinafter Are Burn Pits
Making Soldiers Sick?] (disputing accuracy of studies).
120. See id. (noting comprehensive study of burn pit exposure needs to in-
clude size of particulate matter).
121. Id. at 2 (explaining importance of why size of particulate matter is essen-
tial to understanding adverse health effects of burn pit exposure).
122. Id. (listing health risks from burn pit exposure).
123. Leo Shane III, Families, DOD Spar Over Dangers Of Burn Pit Smoke, STARS
AND STRIPES (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.stripes.com/news/families-dod-spar-over-
dangers-of-burn-pit-smoke-1.96179 (noting DoD's official position that burn pit in-
halation causes only minor, temporary effects from inhalation of toxic smoke).
124. Kelly Kennedy, DoD Shows First Signs of Acknowledging Burn-Pit Woes, ARMY
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2010), available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/01/mil-
itary-bumpit pentagon_011810w/ (showing DoD's change in official stance on
health effects from burn pit exposure); see also Kurera, supra note 57, at 293 (citing
article).
125. See Bartoo, supra note 10, at 24-25 (lauding accomplishments of Dr.
Miller and his studies on harmful respiratory effects of burn pit exposure).
126. See id. at 21-23 (outlining Dr. Miller's study on detrimental effects of
burn pit exposure).
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ins in Iraq and Afghanistan, which could potentially result in
permanent lung damage.' 27
The Vanderbilt medical staff became involved when Sallie
Lewis, a nurse practitioner at Blanchfield Army Community Hospi-
tal, noted a large number of soldiers with an extreme shortness of
breath during their two-mile runs and an inability to pass standard
physical requirements.128 The conventional tests administered to
these soldiers for shortness of breath produced normal results.129
Thus, more than fifty soldiers were sent to Dr. Miller between 2003
and 2005, to whom the soldiers shared similar stories of significant
exposure to sulfur fire smoke in 2003 or breathing burn pit emis-
sions across Iraq.o30 Dr. Miller consequently performed surgical bi-
opsies to check for constrictive bronchiolitis, a rare condition
involving the narrowing of the tiniest and deepest airways of the
lungs.' 3 ' The biopsy results were eye-opening and conclusive-
twenty-six of the thirty-one lung biopsies confirmed the soldiers had
constrictive bronchiolitis.132
The medical staff agreed with the soldiers' anecdotal evidence
that exposure to toxic smoke caused the constrictive bronchi-
olitis.133 J.D. Williams, an aviation officer diagnosed with constric-
tive bronchiolitis, slept an eighth of a mile from the massive burn
pits at JBB.13 4 Similarly, most soldiers diagnosed with constrictive
bronchiolitis were exposed to burn pit smoke. 35 After the conclu-
sive results of the biopsies performed by Dr. Miller, Matthew King, a
resident in the Division of Allergy, Pulmonary and Critical Care
Medicine Division at Vanderbilt University, voiced his distress re-
127. See id. at 23-25 (showing extensive effort and studies by Dr. Miller to
prove burn pits can cause respiratory illness).
128. See id. at 22 (observing shortness of breath among soldiers exposed to
burn pits).
129. See id. (showing conventional studies came out normal and further stud-
ies must be conducted).
130. See Bartoo, supra note 10, at 24 (finding soldiers sharing similar stories of
exposure to burn pits).
131. See id. (explaining additional studies had to be conducted to determine
effects of burn pit exposure on soldiers' respiratory system).
132. See id. at 22 (releasing findings from biopsy and finding twenty-six out of
thirty-one soldiers were diagnosed with constrictive bronchiolitis). For a further
discussion on how the results from the biopsies have been eye-opening and quite
conclusive, see infra notes 137-135 and accompanying text.
133. See Bartoo, supra note 10, at 22 (citing Dr. Miller regarding inhalation
injuries, suffered in line of duty).
134. See id. (describing one soldier's experience, which is similar to other sto-
ries shared by soldiers exposed to burn pit smoke).
135. See id. (recognizing commonalities between soldiers diagnosed with con-
strictive bronchiolitis).
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garding soldier exposure to burn pits.1 3 6 King reported, "There is a
lot of concern that this is the tip of the iceberg. We are asking
what's causing these illnesses and what prevention and manage-
ment can we offer solders in the future."13 7
Officials of the Disabled American Veterans (ODAV) and cer-
tain members of Congress also expressed concern regarding expo-
sure of soldiers to burn pits.'3 8 More than 500 veterans contacted
the ODAV complaining of illnesses they believed were caused by
burn pit exposure.' 39 Representative Timothy H. Bishop, a Demo-
crat from Long Island, took the lead on the matter in Congress. 40
He believes the issue of burn pits will become more prominent as
the health effects of burn pits become more widely recognized.141
Representative Bishop discussed the possibility of an increase in ill-
nesses from burn pit exposure as "very evocative of the experience
we've had with the exposure of toxins at ground zero in New York.
Just like with ground zero, we are going to see the numbers of peo-
ple who contract illnesses grow dramatically as the years pass."142
The media also conducted its own research criticizing the com-
pleteness and accuracy of the AFHSC findings. 14 3 The Militay Times
reported Army Col. Bob Defraites, director of the AFHSC, was not
able to gather morbidity data (the rate of incidence of various
health problems) on the ten-year trends for troops' health in Iraq
and Afghanistan.' 4 4 Moreover, the AFSCH reports do not track
trends over multiple years, but instead only show the current year's
figures.' 45 In response to the incompleteness of these reports, The
136. See id. at 24 (voicing concerns about soldiers' health).
137. Id. at 25 (quoting Matthew King's concern for soldiers exposed to burn
pits).
138. See generally Risen, supra note 79, at A10 (finding serious concern for
soldiers from both Congress and ODAV).
139. See id. (tabulating number of veterans that contacted ODAV with burn
pit exposure health concerns).
140. See id. (listing members of Congress concerned with health effects from
burn pit exposure).
141. See id. (concerning how burn pit exposure reports will increase as
soldiers become more aware of their health problem causes).
142. Id. (quoting Timothy Bishop regarding soldiers increasingly coming for-
ward in future about their burn pit exposure).
143. For a further discussion on additional studies done by the media that
criticize the completeness and accuracy of the ESHO findings, see infra notes 144-
152 and accompanying text.
144. See Kelly Kennedy, Health Alert: Respiratory Problems, Neurological Conditions
and Heart Disease on Rise Since 2001, ARMY TIMES (Oct. 27, 2008, 12:19:39 EDT),
available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/10/military-10-years-force-
health-101410w/ [hereinafter Health Alert] (discussing limitations on AFSCH stud-
ies on military burn pit exposure).
145. See id. (finding AFSCH study does not include long-term trends).
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Military Times compiled data spanning ten years to identify longer-
term trends on soldiers' health. 146 The Militay Times analysis of the
health data from 2001 through 2009 revealed the rate of respiratory
issues rose by thirty-two percent, complications related to
pregnancies and births increased by forty-seven percent, and neuro-
logical conditions, such as multiple sclerosis and Parkinson's dis-
ease, rose by nearly two-hundred percent. 47
Several of these studies demonstrate that both smoke from
burning wood and dioxins from burning plastic can cause heart dis-
ease and respiratory issues.148 According to the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), most individuals develop emphy-
sema from long-term smoking; but asthma, air pollutants, genetics,
and respiratory infections also lead to chronic obstructive pulmo-
nary disorder (COPD).149 The Military Times surveillance report
showed the rate of COPD per ten-thousand active-duty members
increased 122 percent from 2001 to 2009.150 Further, the rate of
chronic sinusitis increased by 244 percent, and the rate of lower
respiratory infections increased by fifty percent.15 1 The CDC re-
ports that the civilian population between ages twenty-five and fifty-
four with mild or moderate COPD declined over the past twenty-
five years; whereas the number of service members with mild or
moderate COPD more than doubled in the past ten years.152
Medical experts completed additional studies showing the en-
vironmental contamination of the surrounding air might be re-
sponsible for even more serious health effects on soldiers. 53 Anna
Johnson, an epidemiologist at the University of North Carolina who
studies veteran populations, found congenital heart disease for mil-
146. See id. (implementing studies including ten year trends on soldiers'
health from 2001 to 2009).
147. See id. (listing statistics from The Military Times surveillance report show-
ing declining health of soldiers from 2001 to 2009).
148. See id. (explaining possible reasons for decline in soldiers' health from
2001 to 2009).
149. See Kennedy, Health Alert, supra note 144 (delineating ways people de-
velop emphysema, including inhalation of air pollutants).
150. See id. (presenting statistics on various ways active-duty military soldiers
developed COPD from 2001 to 2009).
151. See id. (imparting data showing devastating effects of burn pit exposure
on respiratory system).
152. See id. (providing additional statistics providing evidence that burn pit
exposure causes respiratory problems).
153. For a further discussion of studies performed by medical experts con-
cluding environmental contamination of the air may cause serious health effects
for soldiers, see infra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
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itary members increased by 120 percent from 2001 to 2009.154
Obesity, a significant factor in the cause of heart disease, declined
among military members, which led Johnson to attribute the in-
crease in heart disease to environmental factors.15 5 Some studies
link deaths from heart disease to biological warfare agent expo-
sure. 5 6 Soldiers exposed to sarin gas during Operation Desert
Storm, for example, had an increased risk of brain cancer.' 5 7 Lieu-
tenant Curtis performed an environmental sampling in Iraq and
wrote a memo outlining the carcinogens, neurotoxins, and chemi-
cals known to cause respiratory complications and other problems
associated with burn pits. 15 8 The morbidity data is bittersweet vindi-
cation for him as he says, "[t]he proof is in the pudding. All the
environmental sampling in the world is a secondary standard to. . .
the primary standard: Are people getting sick?"159
With the difficulty of providing hard data and the lack of long
term studies on burn pit exposure, the strongest indication that
toxins released from burn pits cause serious health problems are
the anecdotal stories of troops exposed to the burn pits.160 Of the
plethora of soldiers exposed to burn pits, two anecdotal stories are
salient.' 6 ' After spending four and a half months working as a sur-
geon at the Balad Combat Support Hospital, retired Air Force Lieu-
tenant Colonel Steve Bowers said his headaches were so severe he
sought an MRI when he returned home.162 "You don't just come
out of that environment and recover.... I had headaches for three
months after I got home. Guys who spent 15 months there would
154. See Kennedy, Health Alert, supra note 144 (citing statistical increase in
congenital heart disease for veteran populations).
155. See id. (explaining reason for statistics pointing towards environmental
pollution).
156. See id. (linking toxic exposure to serious soldier illnesses).
157. See id. (listing other toxic chemicals causing soldier illness).
158. See id. (finding Lt. Curtis had large role in bringing awareness of dangers
of burn pit exposure to public).
159. Kennedy, Health Alert, supra note 144 (quoting Lt. Curtis, who under-
stood difficulty in providing conclusive data related to burn pit exposure, but
thought soldier illnesses pointed towards burn pit exposure).
160. Kelly Kennedy, VA, DoD Seek Better Data on Burn-Pit Exposure, ARMY TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2010, 17:45:10 EST), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/02/mili-
tary-burn-pits-022310w/ (explaining difficulty in providing reliable and conclu-
sive data when examining burn pit statistics).
161. For anecdotal stories related to soldiers' exposure to burn pit smoke, see
infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
162. See Kennedy, Bum Pit, supra note 28 (relaying Air Force Lt. Col. Steve
Bowers' recollection of bum pit exposure).
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have a harder health hit."' 6 He said virtually everyone on base had
some version of "plume crud," was "coughing up black stuff," and
also had "sinus problems, nasal congestion, bad coughing, and
headaches." 164 Army Sergeant Loyd Sawyer said he worked at the
JBB mortuary, approximately 400 yards from the burn pit.'6 5 He
explained, "They had to abandon the guard tower near [the pit]
because they kept getting respiratory infections. . . . It was just a
wall of fire above our unit. Guys were coughing up black stuff,
coughing up blood. I had a steroid inhaler because I got bronchi-
tis." 166 The detailed and harrowing stories from soldiers exposed to
burn pits, independent studies conducted by medical experts, and
investigations completed by the media paint a picture of burn pit
exposure as causing detrimental and long-term health problems for
soldiers.' 6 7
V. THE FUTURE OF BURN PITS: REGULATIONS, LEGISLATION, AND
SOLDIERS' BENEFITS
In January 2011, both Congress and the public rallied to pro-
tect soldiers from the environmental harms of unregulated military
burn pits.16 8 The government did not take action until after the VA
determined that Army Sergeant William McKenna died of a rare
form of lymphoma due to exposure to burn pit fumes in Iraq.169
The death of Army Sergeant McKenna impelled the DoD to enact
measures in response to the fomenting public outcry. 170 As a result
of his death, Senator Charles Schumer and Senator Bill Nelson
wrote to the DoD and urged it to impose safety precautions for
163. Id. (quoting Air Force Lt. Col. Steve Bowers' experience at JBB burn
pit).
164. Id. (quoting Air Force Lt. Col Steve Bowers' experience atJBB burn pit).
165. See id. (relaying Army Sgt. Loyd Sawyer's experience atJBB burn pit).
166. Id. (quoting Army Sgt. Loyd Sawyer's experience at JBB burn pit).
167. For previous discussion of soldier exposure to burn pits, independent
studies conducted by medical experts, and investigations completed by the media
concluding burn pit exposure causes detrimental and long-term health effects on
soldiers, see supra notes 113-159 and accompanying text.
168. For further discussion of pressure from the public and Congress to pro-
tect soldiers from the harms of military burn pits, see infra notes 169-176 and ac-
companying text.
169. See Rick Maze, Troops Near Burn Pits to Get Masks, Respirators, AiR FORCE
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2011, 16:51:02 EST), http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/
02/military-burn-pit-masks-respirators-021011w/ (explaining impetus for DoD's
quick response).
170. See id. (explaining why DoD finally enacted stronger measures to protect
soldiers).
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those working close to the noxious fumes.1'7 In a February 7, 2011
response letter to Senators Schumer and Nelson, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen pledged that protective equip-
ment, such as respirators and gas masks, would be made available to
deployed troops near burn pits.' 7 2 Further, he promised to imple-
ment a policy promoting the use of protective equipment within
sixty days.' 73
Additionally, Mullen stated in his letter that, for the long-term,
CENTCOM is buying and installing an estimated two-hundred
solid-waste incinerators for use in Afghanistan.1 7 4 The letter also
stated that all open air burn pits in Iraq were closed in 2010, and
any burn pits used in Afghanistan would comply with the revised
DoD regulations prohibiting incineration of hazardous and medical
waste.' 7 5 Moreover, CENTCOM attempted to reduce burn pit ex-
posure by limiting the permissible times and conditions under
which to operate open fires.17 6 Thus, the DoD has significantly im-
proved its burn pit policies by closing down some burn pits, and
enforcing regulations on the pits still in operation. 7 7
While the DoD has made significant strides towards becoming
environmentally responsible, there are two questions still left unad-
dressed.178 First, how can the DoD become more environmentally
responsible when removing waste?' 79 Second, can troops exposed
to burn pit smoke receive full benefits from the VA even though the
leading governmental study concludes that "there was no substan-
tial or consistent health effects" associated with exposure to burn
pits?' 80
171. See id. (describing contents of letter Senator Charles Schumer and Sena-
tor Bill Nelson sent to DoD after death of Sgt. William McKenna).
172. See id. (indicating DoD's response to Senator Schumer and Nelson).
173. See id. (finding instructions on how to promote use of safety equipment
will be ready in sixty days).
174. See Maze, supra note 169 (pledging to reduce burn pits in Afghanistan by
installing incinerators).
175. See id. (indicating further attempts to limit burn pit exposure).
176. See id. (indicating DoD's intention to restrict further use of burn pits in
Afghanistan).
177. For a discussion of the DoD's significant improvements in closing down
burn pits and regulating the pits that cannot be shut down, see supra notes 168-177
and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of two questions related to burn pit exposure, see infra
notes 179-203 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion on how the DoD can become more environmentally
responsible when removing waste, see infra notes 180-187 and accompanying text.
180. See generally DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 11, at 2 (concluding study yielded
no tangible results to substantial military burn pit exposure as cause of adverse
health effects on soldiers). For a discussion of the plausibility of troops exposed to
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The DoD's path towards environmental responsibility in re-
moving waste from Afghanistan and Iraq begins with the GAO rec-
ommendations.181 The GAO indicated various alternative waste
management practices, such as recycling, incinerators, and land
fills, to manage the DoD's wartime waste stream, decrease the vol-
ume and potential toxicity of the waste, and reduce the potential
health impacts of burn pits at U.S. bases in Afghanistan. 18 2 Re-
cycling, however, may prove to be a difficult alternative as military
bases are often located in remote areas without an infrastructure to
support a market for recycled materials.'83 CENTCOM officials
deemed burning waste a more viable option than implementation
of an efficient recycling program, which would require: manage-
ment of a sorting facility, a viable market for recycled products, and
retaining trained environmental officers on the base. 184
DoD officials contend incinerators are the best combustion al-
ternative to open burn pits, which is exemplified by the recent de-
velopment and implementation of two-hundred solid waste
incinerators in Afghanistan.'8 5 Incinerators are a better alternative
to open burn pits due to the more complete burn in the enclosed
combustion chambers, large reduction in volume of waste, and abil-
ity to manage multiple waste streams; yet incinerators still yield po-
tentially harmful emissions.186 Despite the incomplete elimination
of emissions, incinerators provide more control for burning
waste. 187
As to whether soldiers will receive compensation for burn pit
injuries, the VA issued a thirty-page training letter in April 2010
burn pits receiving full benefits from the VA, despite the leading government
study's conclusion that "there was no substantial or consistent health effects" asso-
ciated with exposure to burn pits, see infra notes 181-202 and accompanying text.
181. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 22 (finding alter-
native to waste disposal other than burn pits).
182. See id. (holding DoD has not evaluated benefits and costs of waste man-
agement alternatives relative to its existing practices, leading to lack of key infor-
mation to manage its solid waste).
183. See id. at 26 (finding USFOR-A officials concurred little recycling occur-
ring at bases).
184. See id. (exploring reasons CENTCOM officials found difficulty in
recycling).
185. See id. (stating incinerators are best alternative to burn pits and finding
DoD began relying more heavily on incinerators as alternative to burn pits); see alo
Maze, supra note 173 (finding DoD plans on installing about 200 solid-waste incin-
erators in Afghanistan).
186. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 26 (explaining
incinerators also produce harmful emissions).
187. See id. at 26 (explaining controlled burn process from using incinerators
is more environmentally friendly than using burn pits to remove waste).
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outlining a new policy for determining veterans' benefits after ex-
posure to environmental hazards. 8 8  The letter states, "Service
members can be exposed to environmental hazards in the course of
their military duties, which may result in adverse health effects."189
Large burn pits throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti are in-
cluded as hazards in the training letter. 190 The letter dictated that a
veteran's lay statement of burn pit exposure is generally sufficient
to establish such exposure if the veteran served in Iraq, Afghani-
stan, or Djibouti.191 "Regional office personnel must also be aware
that many veterans suffering from illnesses such as respiratory,
cardiopulmonary, neurological, autoimmune, and/or skin disor-
ders, may not associate such conditions with bum pit exposure." 192
Thus, the VA indicated that rating authorities must be prepared to
actively review such claims by recognizing potential exposure issues
whenever reasonably raised by the record.193
While the VA appears to adopt a sufficient policy to compen-
sate troops for illnesses associated with burn pit exposure, obstacles
remain for soldiers to receive benefits for their injuries in reality. 9 4
J.D. Williams, an aviation maintenance officer, was diagnosed with
constrictive bronchitis over a year after his retirement, and must
now prove his lung injuries are related to his service prior to receiv-
188. See Letter from Dep't of Veteran Affairs, supra note 84, at 1 (explaining
three main purposes of letter).
First, it will inform regional office employees on specific environmental
hazard incidents that present potential health risks to service members
and Veterans. Second, it provides guidance on handling claims for disa-
bilities potentially resulting from exposure to environmental hazards
while on active duty. Third, it provides 'fact sheets' that may serve as
valuable resources for VA examiners when they conduct Compensation
and Pension (C&P) examinations associated with such exposure. The in-
formation and guidelines provided will ensure claims are processed in an
objective and compassionate manner across all regional offices.
Id.
189. Id. (finding numerous environmental hazards identified in Iraq, Afghan-
istan and other military installations could possibly pose health risks to service
members and veterans).
190. See id. (listing military bases where burn pits are present).
191. See id. at 4 (explaining veterans' lay statement is sufficient because of
extensive use of burn pits and lack of identification of all duty locations).
192. Id. (explaining many veterans will be unaware that illness or injury may
be from burn pit exposure because exposure to burn pits is well-known fact).
Further, if toxin exposure is raised by a veteran, he or she will generally not be
aware of what toxins were released by burn pits. Id.
193. See Letter from Dep't of Veteran Affairs, supra note 84, at 1 (explaining
rating agency must actively review records due to veterans' general unawareness of
injury or illness potentially caused by burn pit exposure).
194. For a further discussion of veterans having difficulty receiving benefits
from burn pit exposure, see infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
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ing compensation benefits.195 Further, soldiers are sometimes una-
ware that exposure to burn pits caused their injuries.196 Latent
illnesses from burn pit exposure provide yet another obstacle for
soldiers to receive compensation.' 9 7 Soldiers were exposed to burn
pit smoke as early as 2004, and it becomes increasingly difficult to
prove a compensable injury if the weight of proof rests on the
soldiers. 198
Moreover, even if the VA acknowledges a soldier's health
problems are a result of burn pit exposure, the VA may contend the
soldier's condition will improve, and thus not fully compensate the
soldier for the injuries. 99 A prime example of the VA's policy is
the story of Tim Wymore, a soldier exposed to the JBB burn pit,
who has three lesions on his brain, one lesion on his eye, a blood
disorder, a damaged esophagus, and a partially removed colon. 200
The VA believes his condition may improve and has yet to declare
Wymore permanently disabled, which leaves his family ineligible for
many benefits. 20 Wymore is further concerned that should he pass
away, the VA will deny payment of a survivor's benefit to his wife,
unless she proves his death is directly related to his military
service. 202
Although the DoD has recently taken significant strides to pro-
tect troops against the environmental hazards of burn pits, there
are many lessons from the mistakes. 203 Soldiers remain in a precari-
195. See Bartoo, supra note 10, at 21 (explaining difficulty in receiving full
benefits). Further, the article quotes Williams on the future of receiving full bene-
fits from burn pit exposure. Id. "It may take years for me to get any compensation
from this, but we need people like Dr. Miller to help out the younger guys who are
being told now they have to leave their career in the military. It's an injury, but it's
on the inside, something they can't see. But it has changed us." Id.
196. See Letter from Dep't of Veteran Affairs, supra note 84, at 12-13 (explain-
ing veterans' unawareness of injuries).
197. See Kurera, supra note 57, at 300 (finding latent illnesses provide occa-
sion for intervening events that weaken causal relationship).
198. See id. at 300-301 (explaining difficulty in proving causation if weight of
proof rests on soldiers).
199. For a discussion of how the VA may acknowledge health problems re-
lated to burn pits, yet not fully compensate a soldier for his injuries if the VA
believes the soldier's condition will improve, see infra notes 200-202 and accompa-
nying text.
200. See O'Connor, supra note 87 (describing Tim Wymore's injuries and ex-
plaining his fear regarding impact on his family if he passes away).
201. See id. (finding benefits denied Mr. Wymore include medical insurance
for his wife and college costs for his three sons).
202. See id. (finding difficulty in receiving death benefits from burn pit
exposure).
203. For a discussion on the lessons learned from DoD's mistakes, see infra
notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
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ous position due to the DoD's lack of environmental planning, slow
reaction to soldiers' complaints about burn pits, inability to pro-
duce conclusive data on burn pit exposure, and obstinate refusal to
acknowledge the relationship between inhalation of toxic smoke
and long-term health impacts on troops.204 Even though the VA
lowered the burden for soldiers to receive benefits, many of those
soldiers still face difficulties prior to actually receiving compensa-
tion for burn pit associated injuries. 205 Thus, soldiers remain un-
well from their exposure to burn pits, and some soldiers remain
uncompensated for their injuries. 206 The unfortunate reality is
some soldiers avoided enemy fire and roadside bombs, but cannot
escape illness and injury due to the DoD's failure to regulate mili-
tary burn pits. 2 0 7
Michael Riess*
204. For an exploration of the DoD's mistakes surrounding burn pits in Iraq
and Afghanistan, see supra notes 1-203 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion on how the VA has made it easier to receive full benefits
for exposure to burn pits and the obstacles soldiers must hurdle to receive bene-
fits, see supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion on how soldiers remain sick from their exposure to burn
pits, see supra notes 113-167 and accompanying text, and for discussion on how
some soldiers remain uncompensated for their injuries, see supra notes 188-202.
207. For a discussion of DoD's failure to regulate military burn pits, see supra
notes 39-72 and accompanying text, and for discussion on how soldiers could not
escape illness and injury, see supra notes 73-167.
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Uni-
versity of Michigan.
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